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ABSTRACT 
A5/1 and A5/2 are the GSM encryption algorithms that pro-
tect user data transmission over air. However, both of the 
A5/1 and A5/2 were cryptanalized by using different attack 
techniques such as time-memory trade off, divide and con-
quer and correlation attacks. In this study, we present a 
modified version of the A5/1 and A5/2 with offering security 
improvements to the vulnerabilities of the algorithms. By 
changing just the clocking mechanism of the shift registers 
used in the algorithms, it is shown that known attacks tech-
niques become impractical. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Encryption in mobile communication is very crucial to pro-
tect information of the subscribers and avoid fraud. GSM 
uses A5 stream generator to encrypt digital user data trans-
mitted from mobile station to the base station and base sta-
tion to the mobile station. A5 stream cipher has two major 
variants:  A5/1 is the stronger version used in western Euro-
pean countries and A5/2 is the weaker version used in the 
other countries.  
Attacks against A5 algorithms have been presented in differ-
ent papers [1-6]. In [1], it is shown that cryptanalysis of A5/1 
can be performed on a single PC with a few minutes of com-
putational time and about 150-300 Gbytes of memory. An 
attack against A5/2 has been also discussed in [5]. According 
to the paper, A5/2 can be easily cryptanalized about 217 time 
complexity.  
In this paper, we propose a modified version of A5 stream 
cipher with providing security enhancements that make the 
time-memory trade-off attacks and divide & conquer attacks 
impractical. The improvements that increase the security of 
the algorithm mainly based on the characteristic clocking 
mechanism of the proposed model.  
2. A  BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF A5/1 AND A5/2 
In GSM, each conversation is sent as a sequence of frames 
every 4.6 millisecond. Each frame contains 114 bits for 
communication from the mobile to base station and 114 bits 
for communication from base station to the mobile.  For each 
conversation user data can be encrypted by a new secret ses-
sion key Kc and for each frame, Kc is mixed with a publicly 
known frame counter Fn. The result of this process serves as 
the initial state of A5 stream generator which produces 228 
pseudo random bits. These generated 228 bits are XOR'ed 
by 228 bits of the plaintext to produce 228 bits of the cipher 
text.  
 
2.1 Description of A5/1  
A5/1 stream cipher is a binary linear feedback shift register 
(LFSR) based key stream generator. It combines three 
LFSRs of lengths 19, 22 and 23 bits which are denoted by 
R1, R2 and R3 respectively [1]. All of these registers have 
primitive feedback polynomials and each register is updated 
according to its own feedback polynomial. The taps of R1 
are at bit positions 13, 16, 17, 18; the taps of R2 are at bit 
positions 20, 21; and the taps of R3 are at bit positions 7, 20, 
21, 22. The three registers are maximal length LFSRs with 
periods 219 -1, 222 - 1, and 223 -1, respectively. The output of 
A5/1 is produced by XOR’ing the most significant bit of 
each register as shown in Figure 1.  
Each LFSR has a single clocking tap in bit 8 for R1, bit 10 
for R2 and bit 10 for R3; denoted as C1, C2 and C3 respec-
tively. Clocking mechanism of each LFSR is determined 
according to the majority rule: Each clock cycle majority of 
C1, C2, and C3 is calculated and two or three registers whose 
clocking tap value is the same as majority bit are clocked [1]. 
Since at each clock cycle at least two LFSRs are clocked, an 
individual LFSR moves with probability 3/4 and stops with 
probability 1/4. 
The initial state of A5/1 is carried out as follows: All of the 
registers are first zeroed and then 64 bit secret session key Kc 
and 22 bit frame number Fn XOR'ed (ignoring majority rule) 
in parallel into the least significant bits (lsb) of the three reg-
isters. In the next step all LFSRs are clocked for 100 clock 
cycles according to majority rule, however no output is pro-
duced. Finally, three LFSRs are clocked according to major-
ity rule to generate 228 bits of key stream sequence.  
2.2 Description of A5/2  
A5/2 is built from four LFSRs of lengths 19, 22, 23, 17 bits 
denoted by R1, R2, R3 and R4 respectively, shown in Figure 
2. Each register is updated by its own primitive feedback 
polynomial which is given in [6]. The feedback functions of  
 
 Figure 1 - The A5/1 Stream Cipher 
 
R1, R2 and R3 of A5/2 are the same as those of R1, R2 and 
R3 of A5/1. Clocking of R1, R2 and R3 is controlled by R4 
and R4 is regularly clocked in each clock cycle. Majority of 
the bits, R4(3), R4(7) and R4(10), is calculated and a binary 
result according to majority rule is obtained. If the result is 
the same as R4(3), then R2 is clocked, if the result is the 
same as R4(7), then R3 is clocked and if the result is the 
same as R4(10) then R1 is clocked. After the clocking of R1, 
R2 and R3, R4 are clocked. It is obvious that, the clock con-
trol mechanism of both A5/1 and A5/2 depends on majority 
rule. However inputs to clocking control mechanism are 
given from R4 in case of A5/2, while in A5/1 inputs are from 
R1, R2 and R3. The output bit is generated as follows: in 
each register majority of two bits and complementary of a 
third bit is calculated; the results of all the majorities and the 
right most bit from each register are XOR’ed to form the 
output bit. 
 
 
Figure 2 - The A5/2 Stream Cipher 
3. THE PROPOSED STREAM CIPHER MODEL  
Most of attacks against A5/1 and A5/2 make use of the secu-
rity flaws in clocking mechanisms of the algorithms. For 
A5/2, R4 controls clocking of the other LFSRs. So if the 
initial state of R4 is determined, for each known output bit, 
exact number of times that a register is clocked to generate 
the output bit can be known. As a result with the knowledge 
of feedback polynomial of the four LFSR’s, every bit of the 
output can be expressed as a quadratic multivariate function 
in the initial state and the attack presented in [6] can be ap-
plied. There are also attacks on A5/1 due to its poor clocking 
mechanism, although it is the strong version. In [2] and [3] 
divide & conquer attacks have been applied. According to 
these studies: Since the clocking tap positions of R1, R2 and 
R3 are known, linear equations about the LFSRs content can 
be obtained by guessing the some bits before the clocking tap 
bits. It is shown that by using these linear equations A5/1 can 
be cryptanalized.  
To overcome the above problems, we offer a new clocking 
mechanism for A5 stream generator. The proposed generator 
consists of four LFSRs denoted as R1, R2, R3 and R4 re-
spectively, depicted in Figure 3. These registers are chosen 
the same as those of A5/2 to avoid hardware efficiency loss. 
The new stream generator works as follows: 
For each clock cycle output of R4, R4(16), is checked; if it is 
1 then majority of clocking taps R1(14), R2(9) and R3(3) 
denoted as C1,C2 and C3 respectively is calculated. The reg-
isters whose clocking tap value agrees with the majority re-
sult are clocked.  However if the R4(16) is 0 then majority 
result is not applied, instead the following match rule is used. 
In the match rule three function values, F1, F2 and F3 that 
are related to R1, R2 and R3 respectively are computed as 
shown below. 
)8(4)7(3)3(11 RRRF ⊕⊕=  
)12(4)6(1)16(22 RRRF ⊕⊕=  
)3(4)13(2)11(33 RRRF ⊕⊕=  
If F1 is 1, then R1 is clocked, if F2 is 1 then R2 is clocked 
and if F3 is 1, then R3 is clocked. The register, whose related 
function value is 0, is not clocked. However, if all of F1, F2 
and F3 are 0, all of the three registers are clocked to avoid 
stopping of R1, R2 and R3 at the same time. 
 
Figure 3 - The Proposed Stream Cipher 
 
After the clocking of R1, R2 and R3 is done (according to 
majority rule or match rule), R4 is clocked once. The output 
of the generator is generated by XOR’ing the most signifi-
cant bits of R1, R2 and R3, as in the case of A5/1. 
The whole clocking mechanism is summarized in Table 1. 
As it is mentioned before, inputs to clocking control mecha-
nism are given from only R4 in case of A5/2, and in A5/1 
inputs are from R1, R2 and R3. On the other hand, for the 
new clocking model all of the four LFSRs give input to the 
clocking mechanism which provides security enhancements 
against to divide and conquer attacks. 
 
Table 1 - Clocking of R1, R2 and R3 
4. SECURITY OF THE STREAM GENERATOR 
In cipher design, the essential point that a designer has to 
consider is resistance of the cipher against different attacks. 
Therefore, in this section we investigate some known attacks 
applied on A5 with respect to the proposed stream generator 
to show its security enhancements.  
 
4.1 Time memory trade-off attacks  
In Eurocrypt 1997, Golic presented a time-memory trade-off 
attack against A5/1, based on birthday paradox yielding the 
unknown internal state at a known time for a known key 
stream sequence [2]. In fact the main principle of this attack 
is the same as time-memory tradeoff of S. Babbage’s idea 
[7]. Therefore it is usually known as BG time memory trade-
off attack. If N represents total number of solution space for 
LFSR’s internal state, M represents amount of required 
memory and T represents required computational time of the 
attack, it has been shown that solution space N can be dis-
tributed between time T and memory M, where the inequality 
NTM ≥  must be hold for the success of the attack. Since 
total length of A5/1 stream cipher is 64-bit, there are 264 dif-
ferent possibilities for the internal states of three LFSRs. 
However there are 3/8 unreachable states from internal states, 
so this number reduces to about 263.32 as total solution space 
N according to [2]. For a given 221 known different key 
stream sequences corresponding to 221 different frames, the 
necessary memory and computational time are obtained as 
65.352≈M  and 67.272≈T respectively [2]. 
In the proposed stream generator, there are four LFSR’s of 
total length 81, so according to this model N becomes as 281. 
Considering the new algorithm, the memory and time re-
quirements according to the approach in [2], one can show 
that, cryptanalysis of the proposed model needs 217 =131072 
times more memory or 217 times more time. Both of the cases 
seem infeasible, because as the memory increases from 235.65 
to 252.65, it becomes about 130153 terabyte. Also according to 
this attack, computational time can not exceed 228.67, since at 
most 222 different frames can be used with the same Kc. 
Therefore required increase in computational time is also 
impossible with this idea. So Golic’s attack is impractical 
with regarding the new stream generator. 
A. Biryukov et al. have presented an improved time-memory 
trade-off attacks as biased birthday attack [1]. This attack 
makes an improvement to Golic’s time-memory trade-off by 
defining a specific pattern which is generated by preprocess-
ing many samples. Then in the case of occurrence of this 
pattern in output key stream sequence, possible internal states 
are found. According to [1], if R represents number of special 
states (red states) that are kept on disk, t represents available 
known conversation as number of known key stream corre-
sponding to different frames, k represents length of specific 
pattern and W(s) represents weight of a special state s, then 
the expected number of colliding special states in the disk 
and the actual data is expressed as:  
N
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where N is total number of solution space for LFSR’s internal 
state. In [2], the results have been given for R=235, 
W(s)=12500, t = 120*1000/4.6= 26087 about 2 minutes of 
known conversation and N=264 due to total length of A5/1. 
For these values (1) becomes 0.61 which makes it quite 
likely that a collision will actually exist. The requirements of 
the attack are 146 gigabytes as memory and two minutes as 
length of known conversation.  
This attack can be considered for the proposed generator. 
However as can be seen, (1) becomes 217 times smaller due 
to large value of N=281 for the new model. To solve this 
problem, the attacker has to increase multiplication of num-
ber of special states kept on disk and the length of the con-
versation 217 times more. If the attacker makes a trade off 
between time and memory and he can change the require-
ments as 18.25 terabytes for memory and 1.4 days for known 
conversation length. Neither requirement seems to be sensi-
ble, so we can say that this attack is also impractical with 
regarding the new model. 
4.2 Divide-and-conquer attacks  
Divide-and-conquer attacks work by guessing a part of the 
secret internal state of the stream cipher and then deducing 
the unknown part of the state. So it is something like; guess 
some bits determine the others. Golic has described a divide 
and conquer attack on A5/1 stream cipher in [2]. The main 
idea of the attack is getting 63.32 linear equations and then 
obtaining internal state of LFSR’s by solving these equations. 
According to this attack, firstly n bits from each register is 
guessed and from these bits, attacker infer 3n linear equa-
tions, where n can not be bigger than the shortest distance 
between clocking tap bit and output bit of LFSR. From this, 
the attacker obtains about 4n/3 linear equations, since as-
sumed bits on average define 4n/3 elements of clock control 
sequence and output is known [2]. Also known first output 
bit gives extra one linear equation, so totally attacker can 
have 3n+ 4n/3+1 linear equations. In [2], n is chosen as 10, 
for this value number of total linear equations is 44.33. How-
ever required number of equations is 63.32, so 19 more equa-
tions are required. Golic noticed that if the attacker builds a 
tree structure that store all the valid possibilities for the three 
bits that are input to clock control function, not all 219 options 
need to be considered. This factor results in about 211.16 
amount of time, hence the over all complexity becomes about 
240.16 linear equation set solving which is enough to obtain 
internal state of LFSRs.  
In [3], E.Biham et al. described a different type of divide and 
conquer attack as “Basic Attack” which requires 239.91 total 
work complexities with 2.36 minutes of conversation plain-
text. According to the attack, it is assumed that 10 consecu-
tive rounds the third register (R3) is not clocked may occur 
during the conversation. With this assumption and guessing 
12 bits (9 bits of R1, R2(0) and R3(22)), the attacker recovers 
all the bits of R1 and R2. This step requires 212 amount of 
time. In the second step attacker guesses another 10 bits of 
R3, to get the remained bits of R3. Second step costs to the 
attacker as 215  workload. Therefore expected running time of 
this attack is 227 given the R3 where location is static [3]. Of 
course location is unknown, so attacker needs to examine 220 
possible starting locations. Total time complexity of the at-
tack becomes about 247. By presenting some techniques for 
the attack, they lower the time complexity of the attack about 
to 239.91. 
In both of the attacks mentioned above some bits are 
guessed, then by using clocking mechanism of A5/1, linear 
equations are obtained and unknown bits of LFSRs are re-
covered. If anyone attempts to apply a similar technique on 
the proposed cipher, he has to guess all bits of R4 to under-
stand which rule for the clocking mechanism (majority rule 
or match rule) of R1, R2 and R3 is used. Otherwise guessing 
any small portion of the R1, R2 or R3 does not appear to help 
to determine the initial state of the generator. Guessing R4 
results in 217 extra computational time, so totally attack re-
quires about 257 time complexity. Furthermore, since the 
clocking rule changes depending on R4, some of the obtained 
linear equations from guessing process are not linearly inde-
pendent, so it reduces efficiency of the attack. Therefore, 
divide-and conquer attacks on the proposed stream generator 
seem unlikely to work in practical conditions. 
5. PROPERTIES OF STREAM SEQUENCE  
 
5.1 Statistical properties  
A stream sequence can be unsuitable for cryptographic appli-
cations, if the sequence does not provide good statistics (ran-
domness). The proposed stream cipher is investigated 
against some important statistical tests FIPS140-2 and auto-
correlation test. FIPS140-2 statistical test contains the 
Monobit Test, the Poker Test, the Runs Test, and the Long 
Run Test [8]. These tests are based on performing a 
pass/fail statistical test on 10000 sequences of 20000 bits 
each produced by our proposed stream cipher (software 
implementation in MATLAB). The stream generator passes 
FIPS140-2 in proportion of 99.71%. Also autocorrelation 
test (Golomb’s 3rd postulate) is applied to the new model 
and the resulting autocorrelation of one sequence is shown 
in Figure 4. The autocorrelation is normalized to one at the 
origin. As we can see, there is no significant peak compared 
to the value at the origin. From the test results, we can say 
that the output generated by the proposed generator satisfies 
the randomness properties. 
5.2 Output rate 
By looking at the Table 1, one can realize that each of R1, 
R2 and R3 is clocked once in 11 cases of the 16 cases. So, 
each of R1, R2 and R3 is clocked once with a probability of 
11/16 which is very close to the probability 3/4 for A5/1. 
 
Figure 4 – Autocorrelation test result 
 
Therefore for each clock cycle of a generator register (R1, 
R2 and R3), 45.111/16 ≈ output bits are generated. Output 
rate for A5/1 is 33.13/4 ≈ . As can be seen the new algo-
rithm is a little faster than A5/1 with respect to output rate. 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we have described a modified stream generator 
model for the GSM encryption algorithms A5/1 and A5/2. 
The LFSR’s and primitive polynomials of this stream genera-
tor are the same as those of A5/2. By just changing the clock-
ing mechanism of A5, the new generator provides a crypto-
graphically more secure stream cipher with respect to some 
popular attacks as “divide and conquer” and “time memory 
trade-off”. Furthermore, the period of the proposed generator 
is higher compared to A5/1. This is a nice design characteris-
tic for a stream generator that has to be suitable for crypto-
graphic applications.  
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